July 1991. The graffi ti along the bott om of the statue reads: "We are not guilty" with the word "not" covered over. 229
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The opportunity to present my work at a number of conferences and seminars has allowed me to hone various arguments and incorporate constructive feedback. I would like to thank my fellow panelists and commentators from the German Studies Association, the German Historical A large monument complex devoted to the communist struggle against fascism still greets visitors as they enter onto the grounds of the Buchenwald concentration camp. Such reminders of the past-or memory traces-are not confi ned to Berlin or sites of historical signifi cance. Indeed, they can be found throughout the cities and towns in the federal states that once made up the territory of East Germany-monuments dedicated to heroes of the working class, to former leaders of the communist party, and to historical events important to the German worker's movement.
In order to interpret these memory traces, it is necessary to understand the complicated events that led to the construction of such sites of memory. Following its defeat in May 1945, Germany was divided into four occupation zones. Initially, political power in the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) rested solely in the hands of the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD). Despite agreements among the four occupying powers to cooperate, the Cold War soon took its toll on keeping Germany unifi ed. In May 1949, the three western occupation zones unifi ed to form the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and in October the Soviets allowed their zone to transform itself into the German Democratic Republic (GDR). East Germany adopted many of the Soviet traits of political repression in an att empt to solidify the communist party's control over society. This included the use of Soviet tanks to put down an att empted uprising in 1953, a reliance on the secret police to keep dissidents in check, and ultimately the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Throughout this early period, the GDR claimed to represent Germany's sole successor state and actively sought to distance itself from its West German neighbor. Relations between the two German states improved during the 1970s and 1980s, but did not alter East Germany's claim to represent the bett er Germany. Despite the repressive nature of the state, there were also avenues for resistance and dissonance. These forces united during 1989 to topple the government, tear down the Berlin Wall, and bring an end to communist rule. Following a turbulent year of economic and social change, the two Germanys united on 3 October 1990.
Throughout this period, the East German state made a concerted eff ort to populate the memory landscape with monuments, museums, and commemoration festivals that supported its vision of the past and bolstered the regime's claim to represent the best interests of German society. Many of these socialist state-driven memory projects have seen signifi cant changes and alterations since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Many of the spaces they once occupied have given way to places of modern, pluralistic remembrance. However, the legacy of the SED's (Socialist Unity Party) memory-work did not simply disappear in 1990-remnants of that ideological project remain visible in the debates that occurred (and to some extent continue) over what to do with the cultural heritage left behind by the GDR.
These socialist-oriented sites of memory remain a large and highly visible part of the built landscape in this portion of united Germany. They were the product of a concerted eff ort by the SED to cultivate a very specifi c form of memory culture during the forty years it was in power, 1949-1989. During the 1990s, the citizens of united Germany undertook a public discussion about which memorials constructed by the SED regime during its forty-year reign should remain, and which should be removed from public view. In short, local authorities removed those deemed out of place or superfl uous, such as the colossal memorial for Vladimir Lenin or the hundreds of smaller Ernst Thälmann monuments located in towns throughout the GDR. But local governments also decided to keep many monuments that they judged as still relevant to German history and society. 1 Calls to remove these items have not disappeared entirely. Some Germans see artifacts of an offi cial East German memory culture as relics of the SED's repressive politics, and thus as monuments that should be destroyed, or at least quietly forgott en through a practice of benign neglect. In January 2012, Peter Ramsauer, the Federal Minister for Construction, suggested moving the Marx-Engels monument from downtown Berlin to the Socialists' Cemetery on the outskirts of the city, a place he referred to as a "socialists' dump." 2 His remarks were immediately met with arguments favoring the monument's preservation from political opponents and in the press. 3 Indeed, despite calls like Ramsauer's to remove these monuments from public view, most of the GDR's prestige memory projects remain intact. 4 The memory landscape in eastern Germany has also seen the addition of dozens (if not hundreds) of new memory projects (memorials, museums, historical sites, etc.) that honor previously neglected aspects of Germany's past: the prisons of Bautzen and Berlin-Hohenschönhausen that held East Germany's political prisoners; the inter-German border museum at Marienborn; new interpretive exhibits at Sachsenhausen, Ravensbrück, and Buchenwald; the permanent exhibit at the Zeitgeschichtliches Forum (Contemporary History Forum) in Leipzig; and the Berlin Wall museums and memorials-to name just a few examples. At the same time, heated post-unifi cation debates erupted over whether or not Germany should preserve prominent GDR-era buildings, like the East German parliament building, the Palast der Republik (the Palace of the Republic), or reconstruct other sites, like the Berlin City Palace (demolished in 1950) in an eff ort to rebuild "historic" Berlin. All of these are important debates and reveal a great deal about how a new memory culture-one that is pluralistic, open, and engaged-has emerged since 1990. 5 Nonetheless, those markers of an East German offi cial memory culture that remain represent the remnants of the policies pursued by the SED to saturate the public sphere with icons that it hoped would create direct, legitimizing links to it and its proclaimed mission to create a "bett er" Germany. The fact that many of these icons not only persist, but also have been actively preserved is telling. It indicates that, although the party's memory-work may not have won over the majority of East German society, its memory politics did indeed have a lingering eff ect on East German society that outlived its monopoly of power.
In his study of professional historians in the GDR, Martin Sabrow argues that, while we cannot ascertain to what extent the general population internalized the SED's historical policies, or whether they helped stabilize acceptance of the regime, the fi eld of history functioned as an important place of confl ict over the legitimacy of the party's perception of the past. Moreover, Sabrow notes that a strong divergence in historical consciousness between East and West Germany only began to converge by the middle of the 1990s. 6 A similar case can be made for the SED's memory-work, which was an extension of its policies toward academic historians. While we cannot accurately estimate how successful the SED was in manipulating popular memory, the way in which it att empted to infl uence percep-tions of the past is still important for our understanding of East Germany as a modern state-socialist dictatorship. Indeed, Annett e Leo has found that the SED's memory policies have had a lasting impact on post-1990 German society. Studying school groups visiting the Buchenwald concentration camp in 1997 and 1998, she discovered that both teachers and parents had prepared many students to view the memorial site according to the pre-1990 offi cial interpretation and had ignored newer information about the history of the camp as a Soviet internment camp or other aspects of the memorial site that had been added since 1990. 7 Alon Confi no is correct to point out that the issue of reception is the "ogre that awaits every cultural historian" and that without critically examining reception we risk "constructing the history of memory from visible signs whose signifi cance is taken for granted." 8 However, memory-work (whether in a totalitarian state or by interest groups within a pluralist society) rarely has immediate, measurable eff ects on collective memory. Memory politics must be measured, when measurable at all, over a long-term period.
The period covered by Tailoring Truth spans from the immediate postwar period to the collapse of the East German regime in 1989 and analyzes the evolution of how the state and party sought to harness the power of memory to legitimize its own claim to rule. The GDR's att empt to present itself as the new Germany, the tragic historical shadow from which it emerged, and the presence of a West German rival all turn the state-building process in East Germany into a unique opportunity to explore the creation and eventual erosion of a new state's memory culture and its role in regime legitimation. By exploring when and how the East German state altered its course or adapted its message, we can see a culture of offi cial memory politics emerge that diff ered signifi cantly from West Germany. As Siobhan Katt ago has argued, "Offi cial memory in the GDR meant a restrictive ideological representation of the past with litt le public debate. Offi cial memory in the Federal Republic, on the other hand, was a public and highly controversial topic in West German political culture." 9 Yet even within this restricted representation, we fi nd elements of debate and negotiation-both within the party apparatus as well as between members of the party and the sculptors, museum curators, and others who were tasked to carry out the party's memory-work.
Previous studies that address East German memory politics and sites of memory in the GDR have focused on specifi c events or memorials. 10 The comparative approach of both James Young and Jeff rey Herf are excellent early contributions to the fi eld, but both primarily center on memories of the Nazi period, do not engage with the many other forms of memory politics pursued by the SED, and appear to at least in part champion the West German approach toward memory. 11 In a similar fashion, Thomas Fox's Stated Memory: East Germany and the Holocaust concentrates exclusively on the SED's treatment of Holocaust memory in East German historiography, memorials, literature, and fi lm. 12 Konrad Jarausch and Martin Sabrow, in the many volumes that they have edited or co-edited, have both used their contributions to theorize the role of history and memory in postwar German society. The strength of Sabrow's work rests with his ability to connect the work of professional historians to broader trends of GDR society and Jarausch's contributions have stressed the societal impact of historical narratives and the political role of memory and history (Gesch ich tspolitik) in both divided and unifi ed Germany. 13 By focusing not only on the SED's execution of memory-work but also on the diffi culties it faced in completing this task, Tailoring Truth bridges the gap between two diff erent strains of historiography of the GDR. On the one hand, this study contributes to a growing body of work that examines the limitations of SED rule, while on the other hand it also acknowledges the central role of state and party institutions in establishing parameters for acceptable behavior. Historians have increasingly called att ention to the limits of state power. Jeff rey Kopstein and Mark Landsman have both shown how the party failed to deliver on its stated economic goals, despite the control it wielded over the economy as a whole. 14 Alan Nothnagle and Alan McDougall have both demonstrated that the party also failed to successfully regulate the indoctrination of East German youth, so that young people did not uniformly conform to the party's vision of budding socialists. 15 Indeed, in most instances the party needed to make ideological compromises and never achieved the level of control that it desired. Esther von Richthofen addressed this limitation of party power in her work on the GDR's cultural institutions and argues that this limit was in part due to disagreement within the party apparatus itself as well as between the party and the general population. 16 Indeed, there was also a great deal of debate and negotiation present within the realm of offi cial memory policies as well. Those charged with carrying out the party's memory policies oft en found it necessary to modify the party's vision of the past in order to att ract an audience to a commemoration, to engage a sculptor to create a monument, or to att ract visitors to a museum exhibit.
Such limits of total control stand in contrast to earlier works on the GDR that reasserted the totalitarian model during the early 1990s. Scholars like Sigrid Meuschel and Klaus Schroeder highlighted the overtly repressive nature of the East German regime where the SED was fully in control of the state and society, while other non-state actors played no real part in shaping East German society. 17 Against this resurgent totalitarian model, social and cultural historians have sought to demonstrate that life in East Germany meant more than merely accepting total party control.
This has led to new att empts to characterize the GDR as a durchherrschte Gesellschaft (a ruled society), 18 a Fürsorgediktatur (a welfare dictatorship), 19 and a "participatory dictatorship." 20 While each of these nuanced interpretations of a dictatorship take issue with the concept of totalitarianism, they do indicate a consensus that the SED desired to wield as much control over society as it could, and that it employed multiple strategies that incorporated tactics beyond simply the use of force. This same dynamic can be found in the party's memory policies. The party wanted to control the public representation of the past, yet it was never able to completely control this process and thus found itself constantly retailoring its message and launching new memory projects.
The more we study the nature of the East German state, the less we are intrigued by its collapse and instead fascinated by how it was able to appear to be so stable. Armin Mitt er and Stefan Wolle att ribute the apparent stability of the regime to the presence of an extensive secret police apparatus, the travel restrictions imposed by a closed border and the Berlin Wall, and to the presence of Soviet troops. Taken to its logical conclusion, they argue, once these oppressive elements were removed, the regime began to crumble and eventually collapsed entirely. 21 Against this argument, Andrew Port has argued that despite the repressive nature of the state, East German citizens were anything but silent. Indeed, the major challenges to SED rule, represented by the uprisings in August 1951 and June 1953, erupted during the height of Stalinism in East Germany. Instead, Port fi nds that "social fragmentation-as well as offi cial accommodation-were nevertheless the most important keys to East German stability and the longevity of the socialist regime." 22 Alternately, Charles Maier and others disagree that the East German state was indeed stable and instead point to a long and gradual decline in the regime's political, social, and economic performance combined with decreasing tolerance by the public to accept such conditions. 23 Others, like Timothy Garton Ash, avoid the question of internal stability by emphasizing how external factors such as the growth of democratic movements in neighboring East European states, Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms, and the waning of the Cold War infl uenced the fall of the Berlin Wall and eventually German unifi cation on 3 October 1990. 24 Other historians have att empted to approach studying East German history from below, in the form of a renewed interest in Alltagsgeschichte, with its emphasis on how politics infl uenced everyday life. 25 These authors have made signifi cant contributions to rethinking the power relationship between the party and the people, especially how the party att empted to wield its authority at the local level. Others have focused on how consumer culture and consumption operated as a means by which everyday people could and did infl uence party policy. 26 While the purpose of this study is not to gauge individual reception of the SED memory-work policies, it takes into consideration the voices of individuals when such sources were available, such as in the form of lett ers to the editor, visitor comments, and correspondence between artists and the regime. 27 The GDR only rarely engaged in the polling of public opinion and even these surveys did not ask questions geared toward the study of popular perceptions of the past. Even if they had, one cannot compare such studies with similar polls in the West, since East German respondents could not fully trust that their anonymity would be respected. 28 Instead, when assessing the "success" or "failure" of the SED's memory-work policy, this study relies primarily on the party's internal assessment. It analyzes decisions by party leaders to initiate changes in course or implement new memory policies to explore the party's willingness to continue investing state resources on certain projects or fi nance new initiatives instead. It also looks at the factors that led to such reconsiderations.
Thus, unearthing elements of negotiation and compromise are key elements to understanding the SED's memory-work. In order to bring its vision of the past into the public realm, the state depended on a variety of partners-the museum workers who curated exhibits, the artists who created the monuments, and the organizers and participants of commemoration activities. The formal and informal negotiations between the state and these non-state actors reveal that the state rarely pushed through its agenda without compromise. It is precisely this push and pull between the state and its citizenry over the SED's "memory-work" (Erinnerungsarbeit), the offi cial party policy term, that illustrates the process of negotiation that was necessary to project a party-specifi c interpretation of the past into the built environment.
In democracies such as the United States or the Federal Republic of Germany, we can assume a certain amount of plurality in the way the public engages in debates about historical representation. Scholars of memory have sought to show the importance of competing voices in shaping collective memory and framing offi cial interpretations of sites of memory in Europe. In the case of France, the contributions to Pierre Nora's Realms of Memory demonstrate that non-state actors played a major role commissioning monuments, building museums, or organizing commemorations independently from the state. 29 Contributors to Etienne François and Hagen Schulze's three-volume edited work have looked at similar case studies within the German national context. 30 The collection is organized into categories of memory, such as "empire," "arch enemy," or "guilt," which are explored through 121 essays focused on specifi c memory sites, personalities, events, or concepts throughout German history. Each essay att empts to locate the site of memory within the broader context of German history and interpret how these sites have infl uenced perceptions of the past: "In other words: the individual remembers, but he does not remain alone. The milieu in which he lives creates the parameters, the form, and the content that determines and defi nes a common memory; the historical interpretation and patt ern of perception are created out of the interaction between personal recollection and the shared, collective memory." 31 Within the context of the GDR, the ultimate goal of the SED was to take control of such parameters, instill them with its own ideological interpretation, and then actively use these sites of memory as a means to shape collective memory. 32 This goal of controlling and managing memory was common throughout the state socialist societies of Eastern Europe aft er the Second World War. In each case, communist governments att empted to supplant former symbols of power with new ones that rationalized their position of authority. 33 As Aleida Assmann has stated, "institutions and larger social groups, such as nations, governments, the church, or a fi rm do not 'have' a memory-they 'make' one for themselves with the aid of memorial signs such as symbols, texts, images, rites, ceremonies, places, and monuments." 34 Assmann argues that totalitarian states "att empt to restore the premodern state monopoly over history and under modern circumstances and with modern means." 35 In East Germany, the SED att empted to establish such a monopoly, but it was never able to achieve its goal. However, it did present a "tailored truth" about the past, which was designed to have a long-term impact on how East German society internalized the past and in turn viewed the present. 36 When opportunities arose to commemorate an historic event, construct a museum, or build a monument, the only entity with the resources to pay for such undertakings was the state. Thus, the curators, artists, and event organizers were dependent on the state, which could use its position of power to shape the public's exposure to specifi c strands of memory that it wanted to highlight over all other competing memories. By confi ning the parameters of an acceptable and usable past, the SED dictatorship hoped to control the process of state identity formation and steer it toward contributing to the party's cultural legitimacy.
In his contribution to Verletztes Gedächtnis, Konrad Jarausch separates memory into a hierarchy of three categories-the individual, the group, and the collective. Memories formed and represented at all three of these levels are infl uenced by diff erences in gender, race, nationality, religious affi liation, occupation, and other social experiences. Individual memories are transformed and altered as they work their way up the hierarchy from individual, to group, to collective memories. In a democratic and pluralistic society, this process oft en involves political actors competing to have their interpretations of events dominate in the public sphere. 37 However, in the GDR, where private memories seldom found a voice in the public sphere, the state was able to dominate public representations of the past and thus this book's analysis remains primarily at the top level of this hierarchy, but does occasional dip down into the lower two levels when the sources have allowed such insights.
The intent of this book is not to employ a top-down methodology that reifi es the SED's assertion of power, but to diff erentiate between the party's ideological goals within the realm of memory politics and the extent to which it could implement its policies. The main assertion is that memory policies in East Germany were not static. They were not conceived in 1945 and then simply replicated throughout the entire period of the GDR. Jeff rey Herf has stated that the SED's anti-cosmopolitan campaigns of the 1950s "left a wound that never healed and an offi cial memory of Nazism that remained intact until the collapse of the East German regime in 1989." 38 This may hold true concerning offi cial memory of Nazism in East Germany, but not for all of the other strands of memory that fed into East Germany's offi cial memory. Instead, the SED's approach to memory politics changed over time and adapted to changing conditions and challenges, both internal and external. The projects covered here demonstrate that the SED constantly and obsessively monitored how the state could employ memory-work to further its ideological and political goals. As a result, the state continuously att empted to resolve its shortcomings, both real and perceived, over the course of its nearly half-century of existence.
The SED hoped that memory might function as a non-material means of infl uence over East German society. Despite all the eff ort and resources committ ed by the state and party to this endeavor, the SED ultimately could not signifi cantly infl uence how society viewed the past nor cultivate a unifi ed historical consciousness capable of securing suffi cient regime loyalty to fend off popular opposition. In fact, the state faced opposition to its public presentation of memory throughout its reign, yet it continued to invest its scarce resources in memory projects in an eff ort to bolster the SED's claim to power until its fi nal collapse in the autumn of 1989. As the SED lost control over its offi cial memory politics, ceding space in the public sphere for counter-memories, new opportunities arose that allowed opposition leaders to turn the SED's offi cial memory culture around and use it as a means to protest against the state.
While similar examples can be found in other East European states of how the state att empted to manipulate popular perceptions of the past, East Germany's relationship with the past was unique. Unlike its East European neighbors, who oft en att empted to diff erentiate themselves from the Soviet Union, the GDR faced the extra challenge of competing for its national heritage and historical legacy with West Germany. Just as West Germany laid claim to the democratic traditions of 1848 and the Weimar Republic as the historical foundation for its collective identity, East Germany focused on a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of Germany's past on which it could also construct a collective identity. This search for historical continuity provided the basis for both West Germany's master-narrative and East Germany's antifascist-based counter-narrative. 39 While the metanarratives in divided Germany developed in very diff erent ways, they remained interconnected and oft en responded to historiographical and political developments in the other camp. 40 The study of memory in East Germany is closely linked to the study of professional historians, an area that saw a great deal of att ention even prior to German unifi cation. Western scholars had easy access to the published scholarship of GDR historians. However, they were limited by only reading what the state approved for offi cial publication. Nonetheless, historians such as Andreas Dorpalen and others set the standard for the intellectual history of East German historians based on the materials to which they had access. 41 Following unifi cation, however, historians could study not only published works, but also gain slow but steady access to archival documents, directives, and other ancillary evidence. For example, Martin Sabrow's study of GDR historians and the phenomenon which he has termed the GDR's "history culture," i.e. how historians interacted with the state and party, helps us understand the politicized nature of academic history in East Germany. 42 It is my intention to build on our understandings of the basic structures of East Germany's history culture and extend them into the public sphere. Understanding att empts by GDR historians to (re)write history and develop new interpretations that bolstered the historical continuity of the SED is a necessary fi rst step. To take the next step, it is necessary to look beyond the writing of academics and turn our focus to forms of public historical representation. While there are many categories that might fi t within the realm of offi cial memory-work, monuments, museums, and commemorations were among the most important to the state for its instrumentalization of the new Marxist-Leninist interpretations of Germans past.
This book does not claim to provide a complete account of monuments or museums in the GDR, but rather a historical narrative that draws on a select set. These are representative examples of memory projects chosen from a wide range of possibilities, including fi lm, literature, street signs, the names of schools and factories, and many others. 43 Some prominent memorials have been left out, such as those built by the Soviet Union or the Frauenkirche in Dresden, which was left in ruins as a monument to the victims of the "Anglo-American Terror Att ack," bett er known as the Dresden bombing of 1945, and instrumentalized by the SED. 44 The list of other possible places of memory that could have been included here is extensive. However, the examples chosen for the case studies are intended to provide a means to trace the overall trends in East German memory policies and connect these projects to the legitimating claims of the East German regime. In each case, the state constructed or heavily infl uenced these memory projects in an eff ort to convey specifi c messages to the public. Monuments, such as the one at Buchenwald, or the various political monuments that dott ed the memory landscape in Berlin, were constructed to visually reinforce the party's interpretation of specifi c events, fi gures, or historical sites. Many, such as the Ernst Thälmann statue in Berlin, fi gured directly into the state's antifascist founding myth or were meant to sustain a direct memory link between the current generation and specifi c, earlier heroes of the German working class. Museums in the GDR served as educational instruments for the workers and students. Factories, trade unions, and school groups organized special state-funded trips to the Museum for German History in Berlin and to local "Heimat" museums, such as the one in Merseburg. The most dramatic element of historical representation in the GDR were the commemoration festivals, such as the Martin Luther festival or the annual parade in honor of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg in Berlin. These commemorations brought a diverse group of people together to participate in the memory-work of the state and actively partake in offi cial rituals of remembrance, yet also provided a space for alternative memories.
Using these three categories of memory culture, I identify a series of fi ve stages in the development of a uniquely East German culture of remembrance, each of which form the focus of the fi ve chapters that follow. Although these stages generally occur in chronological order, there are several instances where stages overlap and continue simultaneously with another phase. Chapter 1 looks at the fi rst stage, which took place immediately following the Second World War and extended into the early 1950s. The German Communist Party (KPD)/SED faced the signifi cant task of establishing itself as the dominant party in the SBZ. This process of legitimizing the party in the minds of the German people meant drawing on existing memories of the German working class and elevating the perceived importance of these traditions in order to claim a dominant position in the minds of the Germans. Most importantly, this stage att empted to promote the concept of antifascism as the defi ning element of the SED. Con-cretely, the party sought to shape an emerging postwar memory culture through the renovating the Socialists' Cemetery in Berlin-Friedrichsfelde, hosting an exhibit about the "Other Germany" that highlighted the role of communist resistance, and att empted to infuse the 100th anniversary of the 1848 revolution with its own concepts of how the lessons of the past should be applied to postwar Germany.
Chapter 2 focuses on the second stage of development that took root following the creation of the GDR in 1949. The SED's att ention turned to graft ing the party's legacy onto the new state. This process included fi nding and amplifying the traditions of the German labor movement. It moved beyond celebrating the communist party's antifascist traditions to incorporating broader interpretations of a struggling working class that fi nally achieved its goals with the founding of the East German state. The young state constructed a new Museum for German History (MfDG) that propagated its new line of Marxist-Leninist historical development that culminated in the creation of the fi rst communist state on German soil. The state seized on opportunities to take over memorial initiatives like the one at the Buchenwald concentration camp in an eff ort to establish control over how this site would be remembered. This stage also saw some failed att empts at commemorating Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Ernst Thälmann. Such failures highlight areas where the party was not able to impose its vision of the past on the emerging memory landscape.
The third and fourth stages involved extending the basis for this cultural legitimacy. Chapter 3 addresses the third stage, roughly from the 1950s to the 1960s, during which time the regime endeavored to transfer the memories of the antifascist struggle to the next generation and develop new interpretations of the past that spoke directly to the political concerns of the time. Additionally, the SED sought to locate the history of the East German state within the narratives of local and regional history, which it hoped would provide a more solid footing for the state's own narrative of historical development. The state transformed many smaller historical sites into politically charged interpretive memorials, revamped many of the local history museums in an eff ort to localize the national historical narrative, and sponsored teacher training workshops to bett er infl uence how teachers used places like the MfDG and Buchenwald to educate the youth.
Chapter 4 examines how the fourth stage of development, which covers the 1970s and 1980s, signaled a new direction in East Germany's offi cial memory policies. The new approach allowed for the rehabilitation of historical fi gures and events previously determined not to belong to the GDR's "progressive" state narrative. Such "reactionary" fi gures as the Prussian King Frederick II, the nineteenth-century statesman Ott o von Bismarck, Martin Luther, and others were now seen in a new interpretive light. This made it possible to diff erentiate between acts by these fi gures that led to German nationalism and those that contributed to (or stunted) the growth of the German working class. By expanding the repertoire of acceptable historical fi gures and events that could be commemorated, the regime hoped to expand its reach beyond the party faithful and make inroads among the general public.
Chapter 5 explores how revisions to the national narrative marked the erosion of the historical narrative that the SED had so painstakingly built. This fi nal stage is characterized by the party's resumption of memory projects it had previously abandoned. Having placed new emphasis on the "reactionary" fi gures during the previous stage, the party now felt it needed to return to older memory culture traditions from the founding years. The regime returned to previously abandoned eff orts to construct monuments honoring Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and Ernst Thälmann to defl ect criticism they were now being ignored. However, the diffi culties that the regime faced in bringing such projects to fruition refl ect not only the rigid historical conception of an aging gerontocracy, but also reveal active resistance to the party's narrow interpretation of the past. The growing distance between the memory vision of the party and the state's memory-work partners can be seen in the diffi culty that the party experienced fi nding artists who would create the type of monuments desired by the SED leadership. The party's narrow interpretation also presented the opportunity for opposition leaders to reappropriate the memory of fi gures such as Rosa Luxemburg and use her legacy against the policies of the state. Thus the erosion of the memory culture that the party worked so hard to create ultimately contributed to the SED's demise.
Viewing these three categories of memory over the entire period of SED rule reveals how and why the state's memory policies changed over time.
In the end, it is clear that East Germany's memory culture was dynamic. It developed in stages over the span of forty-fi ve years. The SED drew upon pre-existing memories of the working class and tailored these memories to fi t the new political realities of postwar Germany. Once in power, the party continued to construct a memory landscape intended to further bolster its authority. However, maintaining control over its own offi cial memory policies proved diffi cult. Although the SED att empted to stem the tide of erosion with a new round of political monuments similar to those built during earlier stages, these new projects were unable to hold back the emerging push toward democracy and the public's rejection of a one-sided, state-imposed memory culture.
